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Methodology Underlying Imam Ghazali's Critique of Greek Philosophy

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جامعہ کراچی مرکز برائے تحقیق و دانش مندانہ مباحث

	Topics Index	Pages.No
1.	<u>Introduction</u>	4
2.	<u>The Significance of Imam's enterprise:</u>	5
3.	<u>The context and motive of Imam's Struggle</u>	6
4.	<u>Imam Ghazali's conception of Knowledge and his categorisation of different sciences:</u>	9
5.	<u>Imam's critique of Greek Sciences:</u>	11,12
6.	<u>Modes of Critique:</u>	18
7.	<u>Conclusion:</u>	38,39

Methodology Underlying Imam Ghazali's

Critique of Greek Philosophy

Ali Muhammad Rizvi

“Greater harm is done to religion by an immethodical helper than by an enemy whose actions, however hostile, are yet regular” (T p. 6)

1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to understand the methodological principles underlying Imam Ghazali's critique of Greek Philosophy in general and Greek metaphysics in particular. This would consist in knowing (for example):

- i) The context of Imam's assault on Greek philosophy, which would also tell us about the basic motive of his critique.
- ii) His assessment of the different levels of dangers posed by and entailed by different beliefs, practices and discourses. The principles of discrimination used in this.
- iii) The general principles of critique employed by Imam and their justification.

- iv) The specific principles of critique employed by Imam in the context of his deconstruction of Greek Metaphysics.

2. The Significance of Imam's enterprise:

Why study Imam's methodology now? Let us consider Watt's following comments in order to answer the question:

"Al-Ghazali has sometimes been acclaimed in both East and West as the greatest Muslim after Muhammad and he is by no means unworthy of that dignity. His greatness rests above all on two things: (1) He was the leader in Islam's supreme encounter with Greek philosophy – that encounter from which Islamic theology emerged victorious and enriched; and in which Arabic Neoplatonism received a blow from which it did not recover. (2) He brought orthodoxy and mysticism into closer contact; the orthodox theologians still went their own way, and so did the mystics, but the theologians became more ready to accept the mystics as respectable, while the mystics were more careful to remain within the bounds of orthodoxy (Intro. pp. 14-15).

Islam is now wrestling with Western thought as it once wrestled with Greek philosophy, and is as much in need as it was then of a 'revival of the religious sciences'. Deep study of al-Ghazali may suggest to Muslims steps to be taken if they are to deal successfully with the contemporary situation. (ibid. p.15)

The attitude of Muslims towards the western thought, up to now, can be broadly categorised into two streams: (1) on the one hand we find that the majority of Ulema and their followers have kept aloof from the western thought. They have mainly tried to protect Islamic thought

from the influence of the western thought. (ii) on the other hand there has been people who may broadly be termed as modernists who have essentially tried either to show the essential compatibility of Islamic thought and the western thought or have tried to assess the worth/value objectivity/reliability of Islamic thought on the basis of the western thought using western methodologies and western principles of critique.

What has been lacking in the current encounter of the Islamic thought with the Western thought is the Ghazalian discourse and practice of assessing, evaluating, non-Islamic thought on the basis of Islamic principles of critique. Our purpose in returning to Imam Ghazali is to try to develop the orthodox Islamic principles of critique and methodology for assessing Western thought and practices.

3. **The context and motive of Imam's Struggle**

To understand the motive of Imam's endeavor, it is important to have a clear comprehension of the context of his critique. It seems that the spread of Islam to the lands that were under the tutelage of Romo-Greece civilization brought Islamic civilization for the first time in contact with a group of people who possessed an alternative epistemological conception for accessing the truth (al-haq). Before that Islam was either confronted by the people who were relishing in their ignorance (lack of any epistemological basis for their beliefs) or on the other hand there were people (Jews and Christians) who had the same epistemological basis as that of Islam. With the conquest of territories held by Roman and Iranians earlier, Islam confronted for the first time a civilization that boasted epistemological foundation presumed to be independent of and superior to revelation (al-why), viz: reason or intellect.

Of course the encounter precedes Imam at least by two centuries but by the time of Imam it had assumed a form of a menace, which was threatening to infiltrate into the very heart of the Umma. This had created ‘a class of men’ (within the Umma) “who believed in their superiority to other because of their greater intelligence and insight” (T p.1). They ridiculed and down played the status of revelation as the ultimate arbitrator of truth and falsehood and professed the superiority of intellect as the means of arriving at truth. Their disdain of revelation was manifested in their abandonment of Islamic ways and symbols. As Imam puts it eloquently:

“They have abandoned all the religious duties Islam imposes on its followers. They laugh at the positive commandments of religion which enjoin the performance of acts of devotion and the abstinence from forbidden things. They defy the injunctions of the Sacred Law. Not only do they overstep the limits prescribed by it, but they have renounced the Faith altogether, by having indulged in diverse speculations, wherein they followed the example of those people who “turn men aside from the path of God, and seek to render it crooked; and who do not believe in the life to come”. (ibid.)

The alteration of epistemological standards had resulted in deviation from the beliefs and the true path of Islam. Imam realized the harmful effects of false epistemological notions on the beliefs and conduct of an individual. Imam locates the source of this heresy in the exaggerated, inflated status assigned to intellect and masters of intellect:

“The heretics in our times have heard the awe inspiring names of people like Socrates, Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle etc. They have been deceived by the exaggerations made by the followers of these philosophers – exaggerations to the effect that the ancient masters possessed

extraordinary intellectual powers: that the principles they have discovered are unquestionable: that the mathematical, logical, physical and metaphysical sciences developed by them are the most profound: that their excellent intelligence justifies their bold attempts to discover the Hidden Things by deductive method; and that with all the subtlety of their intelligence and the originality of their accomplishments they repudiated the authority of religious law denied the validity of the teachings of religions, and believed that all such things are only sanctimonious lies and trivialities” (ibid. p.2).

The following reasons of heresy, can be gleaned from the above statement:

- Elevation of philosophers above the status of even prophets due to their purported intellectual powers.
- Belief in the undubitability and self-evident character of the first principles discovered by philosophers.
- Belief in the superiority of deductive method as a rigorous method through which certain conclusions can be drawn from the self-evident first principles.
- Consequently belief in the superiority of Greek metaphysics, logic and physical sciences.
- The above factors lead to the rejection of and contempt of religious laws and religious teachings as such.

The cumulative effect of the above propositions was the creation in the eyes of the imitators of Philosophers what Imam aptly terms as ‘awe’. An “awe” was created around the Greek philosophers, their method, their sciences, epistemology etc; which led to their veneration. The prime motive of the Ghazalian critique was to shake the ‘awe’ once for all. As Imam puts it when he writes about the main purpose of his book Tahafat:

“When I saw this vein of folly pulsating among these idiots, I decided to write this book in order to refute the ancient philosophers. It will expose the incoherence of their beliefs and the inconsistency of their metaphysical theories. It will bring to light the flimsiest and the obscurest elements of their thought, which will provide some amusement for, and serve as a warning to, the intelligent men. (I mean those things which they contributed to beliefs and opinions, and by virtue of which they thought they could be distinguished from the common men)” (ibid. p. 3).

4. Imam Ghazali’s conception of Knowledge and his categorisation of different sciences:

What is Knowledge? And what is its purpose? These are question of prime importance for Imam Ghazali. These questions are also of critical importance for the general purpose of critique as well. Imam builds and develops his critique of different Greek philosophical discourses on the basis of his background understanding and conception of knowledge and its purpose.

The purpose of knowledge (and this makes his conception of knowledge clear as well) according to Imam is: a) Ma’ad and b) Ma’ash. Ma’ad and Ma’ash are ultimately related as halal Ma’ash is essential for the betterment of Ma’ad. Thus the only ‘knowledge’ which is to be sought for its own sake is the one which is related to ma’ad or ma’ash. But since ultimately only ma’ad is to be sought for its own sake and ma’ash is desirable only to the extent that it is necessary for ma’ad, the ultimate criterion to judge a science is whether it contributes to ma’ad or is hurdle to it. Thus the only knowledge in its essential sense is the knowledge of ma’ad and all other discourses are

instrumental to this and are to be judged according to this instrumental character. As Imam puts it in his admonishment for the seekers of knowledge and truth:

“With eager desire you are setting out to acquire knowledge, my friend; of yourself you are making clear how genuine is your longing and how passionate your thirst for it. Be sure that, if in your quest for knowledge your aim is to gain something for yourself and to surpass your fellows, to attract men’s attention to yourself and to amass this worldly vanities, then you are on the way to bring your religion to nothing and destroy yourself, to sell your eternal life for this present one; your bargain is dead loss, your trading without profit. Your teacher abates you in your disobedience and is partner in your loss. He is like one who sells a sword to a highwayman

On the other hand, if in seeking knowledge your intention and purpose between God most high and yourself is to receive guidance and not merely to acquire information, then rejoice” (TBG p. 86).

Here Imam makes it clear that the purpose of knowledge is to seek God’s pleasure and knowledge consists in the fear of God. He clearly distinguishes between knowledge and information. Not all information deserves the lofty name of knowledge; only the sort of information that can lead to or be instrumental in seeking the pleasure of God and warding off his wrath can be termed as knowledge in the sense given to it by Imam Ghazali (cf. IUA chapter 1).

In the light of the above discussion we can hierarchise sciences into the following broad categories:

- Sciences that are concerned with ma'ad in the essential, immediate and direct sense, like the sciences of Quran and Hadith.
- The sciences that are (instrumentally) essential for ma'ad. These sciences are not to be sought for their own sake but only to the extent they are necessary for ma'ad and when they are sought for their own sake they become harmful and impermissible. Like learning Arabic poetry for example which is instrumentally necessary for understanding Quran.
- The sciences that are essentially detrimental to ma'ad, which are to be refuted and banned and overcome as such. They cannot be instrumental for ma'ad they can only be the instrument of Satan. Imam included most of the Greek metaphysics in that category.
- The sciences that are not essentially but only instrumentally detrimental to ma'ad, which are not refuted for their own sake but because of their being instrument of sciences that are (essentially) detrimental for ma'ad. Imam decreed Greek logic to be such a science.
- The sciences that are neutral, that are neither useful nor harmful for the purpose of ma'ad. They are to be rejected because of the prophet's saying that "the beauty of the Islam of a man is to shun useless things". Imam includes overindulgence in instrumental sciences as such an enterprise.

One can introduce nuisances into the above five categories in view of the degrees of instrumentality and essentialness but the fundamental categorisation remains the same.

5. **Imam's critique of Greek Sciences:**

It is in the context of his definition and categorisation of knowledge and general principles guiding it that Imam develops his critique of different Greek sciences and their adequate place in the context of the epistemology of Islam. In what follows I shall briefly consider Imam's critique of different Greek sciences.

I shall take Imam's comments on different Greek sciences in the following:

- **Logic:** Logic according to Imam is an instrumental science: "As regards Logic, it is just and investigation into the instruments of reflection over the intelligibles. And as such it involves no contradictions which might deserve our consideration" (T p. 12). It is a study of argumentation and can be instrument of any side. Philosophers have no sway over logic or any inherent claim to it. Their formidable use of technical and formalistic approach may inspire awe in some but in reality there is nothing exotic about it. Logic consists of techniques, which are used to furbish and cushion up the quality of argument, but it does not say anything about the content of the propositions. Logic consists of only formal techniques, which make the inner consistency of argument clearer. Islam does not deny logic as a tool and there is no need to deny logic, as logic has no essential enmity with Islam. If philosophers use logical techniques the supporters of Islam can also use them. Thus Imam warns against denying logic its due or declaring it as inherently unIslamic as its "only effect upon the logicians is to impair their belief in the intelligence of the man who made the denial and, what is worse, in his religion, inasmuch as he considers that it rests on such denials" (Al p. 36).

It was one of Imam Ghazali's singular contributions that he mastered the most advanced logical techniques available in his time to show the incoherence of unIslamic doctrines.

As Imam puts it: “As regards their contention that reference to Logic is unavoidable, it is right. But Logic is not their monopoly. Fundamentally, it is the same thing as in the Art of Scholastic Reasoning we call the Book of Theoretical Inquiry. The philosophers have changed its name to Logic to make it look formidable. We often call it the Book of Disputation, or the Data of the Intellects. When a gullible enthusiast hears the word ‘Logic’, he thinks that it is a new subject, unknown to the *Mutakallimun* and cultivated by the philosophers alone” (T p. 10).

This however does not deter Imam to remark on and caution against the negative aspects of logic, which should be avoided. First is the tendency to mix logic’s capacity to produce certitude concerning relation between two propositions with its purported ability to produce certitude about the content of those propositions. While logic certainly has the capacity to show the first it is out of its range to do the second. As Imam writes: “. . . there is a type of mistake into which students of logic are liable to fall. They draw up a list of the conditions to be fulfilled by demonstration, which are known without fail to produce certainty. When, however, they come at length to treat of religious questions, not merely are they unable to satisfy these conditions, but they admit an extreme degree of relaxation (sc. Of their standards of proof)” (Al p. 36). The relaxation is needed because religious propositions are not self evident and hence can not be decisively shown to be proven or disproved except by the help of stealth of hand by mixing logical transition from argument to argument with the transition from content to content; which is the domain not of logic but of metaphysics or other relevant sciences. Thus people obsessed by and engrossed in logic who overlooks this difference between the content and the form are tricked in to believe that “the infidel doctrines attributed to the philosophers are supported by similar demonstrations, and hastens into unbelief”

(ibid.). Imam however categorically states that ‘neither the conditions for the material validity of Syllogism-laid down by them in the section of Logic devoted to Demonstration-nor those for its formal validity-in the Book of Syllogism-nor the postulates which they have formulated in the Isagoge and Categories, and which form the parts and preliminaries of Logic are of any help to them in metaphysical science’ (T p. 10).

- **Mathematics:** Mathematics is clearly an instrumental science. It is needed for several sciences, which are essential for ma’ad like the science of inheritance (meeras) and for determining the timings of prayers etc. But there are two sorts of dangers Imam cautions against concerning mathematics and which are applicable to other related sciences as well. It is worth while to ponder on what Imam has to say as it gives us general conceptual tool for dealing adequately with the problem of Islam and Science as it has formulated itself for us in the twentieth century and onward.
 - a) First danger is that demonstrative capacity and clarity of mathematics leads people to believe that “all their sciences resemble this one in clarity and demonstrative cogency” (Al p. 33). The danger, which is very relevant concerning the constant lure of mathematics as a substitute to studying and facing the uncertain features of contingent factual world, which has beguiled the best minds over centuries. Against this temptation Imam puts a rule that seems to be eternally valid for broad sweep of issues facing any student of civilisational clash and encounters: “The man who excels in one art does not necessarily excel in every art. It is not necessary that the man who excels in law and theology should excel in medicine, nor that the man who is ignorant in intellectual speculations should be ignorant of grammar. Rather, every art has

people who have obtained excellence and pre-eminence in it, even though stupidity and ignorance may characterise them in other arts” (ibid.). Imam puts the basic difference between mathematics and related sciences succinctly in the following lines, which remain crucial: “The arguments in elementary matters of mathematics are demonstrative whereas those in theology (or metaphysics) are based on conjecture. This point is familiar to those who have studied the matter deeply for themselves’. (Al p. 33-34). This is an essential point to comprehend for conceptualising correctly the relationship between Islam and Science in general. There is no quarrel between Islam and science as far as science’s claim to ordinary demonstration is concerned. Islam however quarrels with science when it tries to transgress its legitimate boundaries and is deluded by its successes in these matters to aspire to the mental of having say on theological and metaphysical sciences by coaching its conjectures in terms of its ordinary demonstrative procedures. The men of science then claim for themselves authority not only in the matters that fall under their expertise but they aspire to establish their authority on life as a whole. They aspire to combine the authority of parish with the authority of scientist. But this does not follow because as Imam makes it clear excellence in one art or in one field does not lead automatically to excellence in the other. Logically speaking scientist cannot have any authority in the matters of theology and metaphysics qua scientists. The people who cannot differentiate between these two types of authorities are induced to accept the authority of scientists in the matter of theology and metaphysics on the basis of there excellence in the particular sciences, consequently going astray from the path. Imam makes this clear in the context of mathematics: “. . . those who devote themselves eagerly to the mathematical sciences ought to be restrained. Even if their subject matter is not relevant to religion, yet, since they belong to the foundations of the

philosophical sciences, the student is infected with the evil and corruption of the philosophers. Few there are who devote themselves to this study without being stripped of religion and having the bridle of godly fear removed from their heads” (Al. p. 34 cf. T pp. 6-7).

- b) The second draw back of mathematics and sciences in general relates to a quite opposite a group. It consists of people who think, “that religion must be defended by rejecting every science connected with the philosophers, and so rejects all their sciences and accuses them of ignorance therein” (ibid.). This is a disservice to Islam as it creates impression that Islam is based on the denial of facts which it is not. As Imam puts it: “A grievous crime indeed against religion has been committed by the man who imagines that Islam is defended by the denial of the mathematical sciences, seeing that there is nothing in revealed truth opposed to these sciences by way of either negation or affirmation, and nothing in these sciences opposed to the truths of religion” (Al pp. 34-35).

- **Natural Sciences:** On most general terms Imam makes it clear that Natural sciences “are similar to the investigation by medicine of the human body with its principal and subordinate organs, and of the causes of the changes of temperament. Just as it is not a condition of religion to reject medical science, so likewise the rejection of natural science is not one of its conditions . . .” (Al. p. 36). However Imam strongly rejects naturalism supposed by much of Greek natural sciences and shows that naturalism does not follow from natural sciences themselves but is a metaphysical presupposition of those sciences. Imam makes it clear that this is to be overcome by clear ‘recognition that nature is in subjection to God most high, not acting of itself but serving as an instrument in the hands of its Creator. Sun and moon, stars and elements, are in subjection to His

command. There is none of them whose activity is produced by or proceeds from its own essence” (Al p. 37). In sum there is need to recognise the Metaphysical context of any scientific system and not to treat them as value neutral but also realising at the same time that ordinary facts can be detached from their particular moorings in any scientific system. Thus Islam certainly recognises and rejects a specific metaphysical underpinning of Greek natural sciences it does not however treat this as a requirement to deny empirical facts.

- **Politics and Ethics:** Politics and Ethics has not been the main concern of Imam so he does not investigate these sciences in detail but we will briefly consider his points in brief. About politics he says that philosophers borrow their discussions largely from “Divine scriptures revealed through the prophets and from the maxims handed down from the saints of old” (Al p. 38). He makes similar comments concerning Ethics but he adds an important qualification that applies to his comments on the political science as well: “The philosophers have taken over this teaching and mingled it with their own disquisitions, furtively using the embellishment to sell their rubbishy wares more readily” (ibid.). Since Imam does not deal with these sciences in detail we can leave this here.
- **Metaphysics:** Metaphysics is Imam’s main contention ground with Greek philosophers and their followers. To begin with Imam divides metaphysical propositions of Greek philosophers into three broad categories: a) “In the first place, the dispute is centred upon a mere word” (T p. 5). Imam gives example of the use of word ‘substance’ for God and goes on to say that if the “meaning of self subsistence is agreed upon, the applicability of the word ‘substance’ in this sense will have to be considered from the etymological point of view. If from that point of view, the application of the word is

justified, it will still be debatable whether the Sacred Law approves of its use” (ibid.). Imam makes it clear that for determining whether the dispute under consideration is verbal or not, we need not only to determine the common use of words but also the common meaning of those words, since the commonality of words does not necessarily imply the commonality of meaning. b) “In the second place, there are those things in which the philosophers believe, and which do not come into conflict with any religious principles” (T p. 6); c) “In the third place there are philosophical theories that come into violent conflict with the fundamental principles of religion, e.g., the religious doctrines of the world’s beginning in time: of the attributes of the Creator; and of the resurrection of the bodies. All these have been denied by the philosophers” (T p. 8). They also “say that God knows universal but not particulars” which is Imam says a “plain unbelief” (Al p. 37). In *Tahafa* Imam has specifically dealt with these third kind of propositions and has shown the incoherence of the system of which is constituted by them.

6. Modes of Critique:

We can discern in Imam four distinct but independent modes of critique viz:

- a) Internal
- b) External
- c) Minimalist
- d) Essentialist

a) In Internal critique one is inside paradigm, his appeal to people consists in the fact that he shares with them the cultural horizon, but his pathos of distance makes it possible for him to see where things have gone wrong. Seen from this perspective Imam's critique is clearly not an internal critique. He develops his critique of Greek Philosophy from a perspective where his complete loyalty lies with Islam and he has unswayed faith in the supremacy of Islamic epistemology. As he makes it clear his basic aim is to discredit Greek Philosophy and foil the myth of its epistemological superiority (T p. 8). Notwithstanding this clear realisation, however, Imam also realises at the outset the need for a sort of Internalisation to make any critique effective. Imam makes it clear that one needs complete acquaintance with what one is aiming to critique and evaluate. As Imam puts it:

"I (am) convinced that a man cannot grasp what is defective in any of the sciences unless he has so complete a grasp of the science in question that he equals its most learned exponents in the appreciation of its fundamental principles, and even goes beyond and surpasses them, probing into some of the tangles and profundity which the very professors of the science have neglected. Then and only then is it possible that what he has to assert about its defects is true" (Al p. 29).

It is Imam's considered view "that to refute a system before understanding it and becoming acquainted with its depths is to act blindly" (ibid.). In this sense Imam differentiates his enterprise from ordinary *Ilm al Kalam*, because the work of esteemed *mutakallimun* was not directed at the refutation of philosophers but was mainly aimed at innovators within Islam. Thus their superficial knowledge of Greek philosophy: "In their writings none of the *mutakallimun* engaged in the polemic against the philosophers, apart from obscure and scattered utterances so

plainly erroneous and inconsistent that no person of ordinary intelligence would be likely to be deceived far less one versed in the sciences” (ibid.).

Thus even where the mutakallimun discuss certain philosophical problems and issues, they are discussing them from an altogether different perspective. Theirs was exclusively an externalist perspective *visa vis* Greek sciences as compared to a relatively immanentist approach of Imam Ghazali. Similarly the mutakallimun were not addressing the followers of Greek philosophers but were targeting at those who held unorthodox views within Islam and were using certain conceptions and techniques borrowed from Greek philosophy, so that even when they talk about matters related to Greek philosophical sciences they do it in instrumentalist and externalist manner:

“ . . . When ilm al kalam appeared as a recognised discipline and much effort had been expended in it over a considerable period of time, the mutakallimun, becoming very earnest in their endeavours to defend orthodoxy by the study of substances and accidents with their nature and properties. But, since that was not the aim of their science, they did not deal with the question thoroughly in their thinking and consequently did not arrive at results sufficient to dispel universally the darkness of confusion due to the different views of men” (ibid. pp. 28-29).

As mentioned above the arguments developed by mutakallimun are aimed at those who have a basic belief in the fundamental tenants of Islam but may differ in the interpretation of one or the other principles. Thus the argument from reality (for example) has very different meaning for them as against, for someone who does not believe in Islam. The situation is comparable (in our times) to the endeavour of those who muster the scientific facts to prove Islamic tenants. What

is seldom realised is that such arguments though may be convincing to already convinced are useless for men of science. For men of science entirely different kind of argument is needed. Imam does not deny the efficacy of argument from Kalam for everybody, “for the healing drug vary with the disease” (Al p. 29). But the level of internalisation required to evaluate and critique another system is not to be found in a science like Kalam whose purpose has been to “support traditional orthodoxy with the weapon of systematic argument by laying bare the confused doctrines invented by innovators at variance with the traditional orthodoxy” (Al p. 28). Their method in most parts consisted in “making explicit the contradictions of their opponents and criticising them in respect of the logical consequences of what they admitted” (Al p. 28). Such a procedure was advisable *visa vis* opponents who did not deny the authority of Allah and prophet. But against the opponent “who (purport to) admit() nothing at all save logically necessary truth”, this sort of critique cannot be effective. For such an opponent one needs to internalise the techniques of the opponent at the highest possible level (without of course internalising their ethos) and try to show the incoherence of the system from within, so that it may implode from within.

Internal coherence of a system can be differentiated into two types: Logical coherence and System coherence. Logical coherence consists of (formal) internal coherence of a system. Critique of this sort (i.e. aimed at testing the formal coherence of a system) can be termed as minimalist critique and shall be dealt with separately below. System coherence (or *Tahafa*) on the other hand consists in the internal coherence of system as whole (both formal and substantive). When Imam aims at showing the internal incoherence of philosophers he is not only aiming at showing internal inconsistency of philosophical doctrines and philosophical propositions but inherent internal contradiction of an epistemology which is based on the proclamation of the self sufficient character of reason. Imam shows the internal coherence of any epistemology based on

the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of reason. Therefore it is essential not to view Imam's particular objections and refutations in isolation but to view them as a single whole. This is the reason why Imam is so particular about developing a critique that is internal critique without shunning its externalist character. The point is this, like the critique developed by mutakellimun it is an external critique in the sense that it never shuns its basic belief in the superiority of the epistemology it espouses, but unlike the critique of mutakellimun it internalises the point of view it criticises because the nature of opposing doctrine (belief in the self sufficiency of reason) is such that it can only be imploded from within, i.e. it can only be shown to be lacking in coherence by showing from within its non self sufficient character.

Imam shows this sort of systemic incoherence at different levels. It is a well integrated strategy but involves several steps, or several subterranean arguments. Firstly Imam aims at showing simply that the position espoused by philosophers which, they normally claim to be self evident, is not self evident. Second step is to suggest alternatives to their position (mostly in speculative manner) which can be as self evident as philosophers' position and thus robbing off their feet their most powerful claim that their position is based on rationally self evident propositions. As Imam puts it challenging philosopher's claim that the belief in the creation of world involves contradiction:

"How do you know the impossibility of ascribing the origin of something to an eternal will? Is it the self evident rational necessity, or theoretical knowledge, which is the ground of your judgement? Or, to use the terms employed by you in Logic, are the two terms in your judgement joined by means of a middle term, or without a middle term? If you claim that they are joined by means of a middle term-i.e; if your method is deductive-you must state what that term is. But if you claim that this impossibility is known as a self evident fact, why do not your opponents share

this knowledge with you? People who believe in the temporal origin of the world are confined neither to a number nor within a city. And no one would suspect that, out of spite for reason, they believe in something, which they know to be untrue. It is, therefore, necessary for you to prove, in accordance with the rules of Logic, that it is impossible to ascribe the origin of the world to the eternal will” (T p. 18).

Similarly for Imam, for example, it is an argument for the non evidential character of the philosophical beliefs and doctrines and also an argument for the incoherence of philosophers that while they agree in their demonstrations of mathematics and logic they are at variance with each other when it comes to their metaphysical and theological doctrines, because if reason was a self sufficient guide to the truth there would have been no such differences among its practitioners. As Imam puts it:

“ . . . there is nothing fixed and constant in the philosopher’s position. They base their judgements on conjecture and speculation, unaided by positive inquiry and unconfirmed by faith. They try to infer the truth of their metaphysical theories from the clarity of the arithmetical and logical sciences. And this method sometimes carries conviction with the weak minded people. But if their metaphysical theories had been as cogent and definite as their arithmetical knowledge is, they would not have differed among themselves on metaphysical question as they do not differ on arithmetical matters” (T. p. 4).

If your metaphysical beliefs are rationally self evidential type, then why, Imam asks, you differ among yourselves on such crucial matters? This shows that philosophers cannot rely on the self evidentiality of rational necessity to support their argument. It also proves that the argument between philosophers and their opponents does not pertain to some problems that can be

eventually resolved through factual or historical references. Similarly it also shows that the controversy does not and cannot boil down to logical contradiction. And the burden of proof is on philosophers not on us because they have claimed rational necessity and self evidentiality for their core metaphysical beliefs and not us. We are only committed to logical and factual procedures and do not concede to the existence of, as philosophers do, non logical rational necessity and self evidentiality.

The core of Imam's argument is to deny and prove absurd the notion of non logical rational necessity and self evidentiality. This should be considered as the core of the whole Ghazalian enterprise. The propositions bearing metaphysical doctrines are synthetic judgement and are not analytic judgement; they require 'middle term'. Now this 'middle term' must be established through means, which provide 'extra' information that is not already contained in the primary term. For the efficacy of deductive method it is necessary that initial premises are self evident. Now Imam proves that this cannot be the case concerning metaphysical beliefs, as we have seen above. If the initial premises is not self evident, conclusion cannot follow from it by the way of necessity. Secondly if necessity is to be proved the middle term must be there to join the premises and conclusion and that middle term cannot be contained in the premises as metaphysical proposition are synthetic propositions and not analytic propositions. Now if the middle term cannot follow through analysis there must be some other means, which give us access to the middle terms. Greek philosophers thought that the reason had power to intuit and through this power reason could add to our knowledge and this intuition was supposed to provide self evident propositions. This is the basis of their belief in the non logical rational necessity and self evidentiality, which is the main target of Imam's attack.

One further way to prove the absurdity of the notion of rational necessity is what may be termed as an argument from parody. In this sort of argument Imam takes some other argument from their baggage of argumentation, which they claim to be rationally self evident, and proves its absurdity and then draws parallel to the original claim and makes the point that rational necessity is not that self evident after all because if it can be reduced to absurdity in one case then it creates doubt about the whole notion of non logical rational necessity and self evidentiality. Thus while dealing with the claim of the philosophers about the eternity of world and rational necessity and self evidentiality attributed to this belief, he draws parallel to another proposition which is claimed by Plato to be self evident in the similar fashion. This belief is stated by Imam as follows: "Plato thought that the soul is eternal: that, although one by nature, it gets divided when it is related to bodies; and that, after its separation from bodies, it returns to its original character, and is reunified" (I p. 22). Now Imam goes on to analyse this position and to show that it is not that self evident at all:

"This is even more obnoxious; and there is greater reason why it should be rejected as contrary to rational necessity. Let us say: Is the soul of Zayd identical with that of 'Amr, or other than it? If it is identical, it would be a self evident absurdity. For each one of the two is conscious of himself, knowing that he is not the same as any other. If the souls were the same, they would be equal in respect of cognitions which are the essential attributes of the souls, and which enter into all relations of the soul. But if you say that the soul of Zayd is other than that of 'Amr, and that the duality is the result of the division necessitated by the relation of the two souls to bodies, we will say: The division of that which is one, and which possesses no magnitude or quantity, is evidently impossible. How can that which is one become two, nay, a thousand, and then regain its oneness? Such a thing is conceivable in the case of that which has magnitude and quantity.

For instance, the water of the ocean is divided into streams and rivers, and then returns to the ocean. But how can that which has no quantity be divided?” (pp. 22-23).

Obviously reducing a doctrine that is claimed to be rationally self evident and necessary to plain absurdity Imam goes back to draw parallel to the argument which is his main concern here: “The purpose of all this is to show that they cannot render it untenable for their opponents to believe in the origination of the world by the eternal will, unless they claim that such thing is contrary to rational necessity. But when a similar claim is made by their critics to refute their own beliefs, it will not be possible for them to silence that criticism. And this is, therefore, and inescapable position” (p. 23).

Another example of such a successful parody concerns the arguments of the philosophers denying the creation of the World by the absolute Will of God, which is summarised by Imam as follows: “So, if the origin of the world is ascribed to God’s action the question remains: Why now, and why not before?” (T p. 15). Imam parodieses this essential question of “why” in the following fashion:

“Why . . . did the two points in north and south happen finally to be chosen as the poles? Why not did the ecliptic pass through some other (two) points, so that as opposite points on the ecliptic they should have been the poles? There may be a wisdom latent in the size or the shape of heaven. But what is it that distinguished the place of the pole from any other place? What caused one particular point, as set over against all other points and parts, to be chosen as the pole? Are not all the points similar; are not all the parts of a round body equal? The philosophers cannot find a way out of this difficulty” (T p. 29).

Hence showing the incoherence of philosophers in claiming complete rational justification of every belief based on their belief in the rational necessity and self evidentiality but being unable to account for their own simple factual explanations of the nature and its phenomena. Also showing their internal incoherence by showing that what they apply to judge other's, they do not apply to judge themselves etc.

Imam's argument is the classical example of what the mutakallimun, medieval rhetoricians, logicians and practitioners of manazara had known for long as, al jawab al ilzami, and Imam gives this sort of argument new peaks in his critique of Greek metaphysics. This sort of argument involves making use of both internal critique as far as judging the claims of opponents is concerned but yet maintaining one's own exteriority by not letting one's own position be judged according to the opponent's standards. The argument is negative in its character in the sense that although it does question the opponent it does not take upon itself to defend its own position, and legitimately so, because through early internalisation it asks its opponent to prove his position according to his own standards and not according to some external standards, yet also legitimately refusing to take upon itself to prove its position according to opponent's standards or letting its position be judged by opponents position because it fundamentally questions that position and do not allow its own belief system be judged through that position. The aim is to render opponent's position reduced to incoherence and absurdity. This involves different sorts of arguments at different levels, as we saw briefly above, we will summarise them as follows:

- Rejecting the claim that metaphysical beliefs and controversies are based on self-evidence of any sort. For example showing that alternative claims can be seen as self evident as the claim itself.

- Showing factual and historical errors in the opponent's position.
- Showing logical contradictions in the opponent's position.
- Showing the absurdity of the notion of rational self sufficiency through the above means and also through the argument from parody mentioned above.

b) When we try to evaluate a paradigm other than our own, we are engaging in external critique. We can evaluate the other paradigm by testing its internal coherence. Again, we can judge other paradigms by their own standards as Imam does when he tries to unearth the insufficient character of reason from within (see above).

This sort of combination of internal and external critique is achieved through working on the level of affective rationality and aims at discrediting the position of the other paradigm. When we work at this level, we have to muster all the forces available to us. We combine at this level all types of critiques available to us not in a detached and disinterested manner but combining all arsenals at our disposal in order to discredit the other position. At this level, we are engaged in a sort of war, not in the ordinary sense of the word but what may be termed as the war of spirits. The efficacy of our argument at this stage presupposes the creation of an environment or an atmosphere, which is conducive to our argument and uncondusive to the argument of the position we are attacking. The creation of such an atmosphere is a long process and can take centuries to complete. This is an extended epistemological warfare and like any warfare involves attacks, ambushes, retreat, etc. As Imam puts it: "Let it be known that it is our purpose to disillusion those who think too highly of the philosophers, and consider them to be infallible by undertaking to expose the incoherence and contradiction involved in their thought. Therefore I will approach them in order to attack them, not to defend something of mine" (T' p. 8).

What I want to emphasise here is this: while pointing towards the need for internalisation and immanence, Imam never gives up the vantage point that forms the background of all his internalist and immanent critique. There is no equivalent of presuppositionless philosophy in Imam despite his realisation that any effective critique of the Greek philosophy would require the mastery of its fundamental principles and imploding it from within. Imam never succumbs to any form of 'neutrality'. Imam's critique requires and presupposes ultimate situation within Islamic paradigm. The critique ultimately presupposes the truth of Islam and falsehood of Greek science and philosophy. The critique cannot even begin without this presupposition. Immanent critique must ultimately be situated within the context of an externalist critique.

Thus to begin with Imam clearly states the infidel and irreligious character of Greek philosophy (although he does recognise that different philosophical schools have degrees in there remoteness from the truth). As he puts it: "There are various schools of philosophers . . . and there sciences are divided into various branches; but throughout their numerous schools they suffer from the defect of being infidels and irreligious men, even although of different groups of philosophers-older and most ancient, earlier and more recent-some are much closer than others" (AI p. 30).

Imam makes it clear that, positively speaking, there can be no decisive argument on the rational plane and access to the absolute truth ultimately rests upon the possibility of guidance and divine mercy. Thus even in a work like **AI**, which is wrongly, and misleadingly compared to the Cartesian enterprise, Imam makes it clear that ultimate conversion of a person or a group (say from Greek belief system to Islam) rests upon the divine mercy and not on some purported self sufficiency of reason. Immanent critique developed by Imam does not presupposes the (he just

assumes it for the sake of argument) self sufficiency of reason; on the contrary it constantly presupposes the context provided by the external critique. This is the reason why Imam on the level of internal critique (tahafa) is aiming only at critiquing the other side and clearly recognises the impossibility of developing a positive critique on this level. This is why internal critique is negative only and hence presupposes its (positivity) situation in the context of external critique. As Imam puts it:

“The access to the absolute truth does not come about by systematic demonstration or marshalled argument, but by a light which God most high cast into (one’s) heart. The light is key to the great part of knowledge. Whoever thinks that the understanding of things divine rests upon strict proof has in his thought narrowed down the wideness of God’s mercy. When the Messenger of God (peace be upon him) was asked about ‘enlarging’ (sharh) and its meaning in the verse “Whenever God wills to guide a man, He enlarges his breast for Islam i.e. surrender to God’ (Q. 6, 125), he said, ‘It is light which God most high casts into the heart’. When asked ‘What is the sign of it?’, he said, ‘Withdrawal from the mansion of deception and return to the mansion of eternity’. It is about this light that Muhammad (peace be upon him) said, ‘God created the creatures in the darkness and then sprinkled upon them some of his light’. From that light must be sought an intuitive understanding of things divine. That light at certain times gushes from the spring of divine generosity, and for it one must watch and wait-as Muhammad (peace be upon him said): ‘In the days of your age your lord has gusts of favour; then place yourself in the way of them” (Al pp. 25-26).

No immanent critique can proceed towards the truth (al haq) without presupposing the working of divine mercy (Islam). This is to say the mastering of another paradigm and internal implosion is to be effected only in the context of external critique that is in the context of the

presupposition of Islam as the truth and all other aspirants to and claimants to truth are to be judged according to and in the context of Islam (the absolute truth).

This observation (above) brings us to another aspect of internal critique, which is unique to Islamic epistemology and is not available to any other epistemology, which allows it to develop critique of different systems from within (internal critique) without abandoning its own vantage point (external critique). In other words it is only from Islamic epistemology's vantage point of critique that we can bridge gulf between interiority and exteriority.

Islam as a universal message is to be found everywhere (Messengers have been sent to every nation according to the glorious Quran), so to whatever extent a group of people have been gone astray from the path, they still (might possess) a sense of truth, some connection with tradition hailing from that lost memory, a glimmer of hope to which one can appeal: “. . . every piece of knowledge, whether ancient or modern is really a corroboration of the faith in God and in the last Day. The conflict between faith and knowledge is only to the details superadded to these two fundamental principles, the two recurring themes in the teachings of prophets-i.e., divinely ordained persons the truth of whose mission is evident from the miracles they performed” (I p. 3).

The people who deny these principles are to be treated as perverts whose epistemological credence cannot be taken seriously: “It was only a few persons having irresponsible views and perverted minds who deviated from these principles. But in serious discussions no importance can be attached to such persons; and no notice ought to be taken of them. And they must be branded with diabolical perversity and stupid contumacy, so that their example may be deterrent

to people who tend to think that a vainglorious conversion to unoriginal heresy would be an indication of intelligence and good sense” (ibid.).

In this context one of the strategies of Imam has been to highlight those elements in Greek philosophy, which can be interpreted in a way that can be conducive to the acceptance of truth and in discrediting falsehood. In order to do this, Imam on the one hand differentiates between the views of the ancient and modern (Greek) philosophers and on the other hand among the different schools of Greek philosophy and thought. About the first he writes: “This book (i.e. Tahafat) is going to demonstrate that the ancient philosophers whose followers the atheist in our day claim to be, were really untainted with what is imputed to them. They never denied the validity of the religious laws. On the contrary, they did believe in God, and did have faith in his messengers; although in regard to minor details, they sometimes faltered and went astray, and caused others to go astray from the straight path. We propose to show how they slipped into error and falsehood” (I pp. 3-4).

The above is substantiated through dividing Greek philosophers into three different schools viz:

a) The Materialists b) The Naturalists c) The Theists.

Let us see briefly what Imam has to say about these groups:

- i) According to Imam “the Materialists are among the earliest philosophers. They deny the creator . . . and consider that the world has everlastingly existed just as it is of itself without a creator” (Al pp. 30-31). Imam declares them as “Zanadiqah or irreligious people” (ibid.).

- ii) “The second group the Naturalists are a body of philosophers who have engaged in manifold of researches into the world of nature and the marvels of animals and have expended much effort in the science of dissecting the organs of animals” (Al p. 31). The study of the ‘creation’ of and ‘wonders’ of God however did not lead them “to acknowledge a wise creator who is aware of the aims and purposes of things” (ibid.). This realisation lead them to the belief in the self sufficient and self contained character of nature. Although they believed in God, they did not believe in the intervention of God in the natural and human life. Their God is rather akin to the clock maker God of the eighteenth and nineteenth century naturalists. According to Imam they believed “that the soul dies and does not return to life, and they deny the future life-heaven, hell, resurrection and judgement; there does not remain, they hold, any reward for obedience or any punishment for sin. With the curb removed they give way to a bestial indulgence of their appetite” (ibid.). Imam declares this group as irreligious too: “These are irreligious for the basis of faith is faith in God and in the last day, and these, though believing in God and his attributes, deny Last Day” (ibid.).
- iii) The third group is what Imam terms as Theists, and they include, “more modern philosophers and include Socrates, his pupil Plato and the latter’s pupil Aristotle” (p. 32). According to Imam “The theists in general attacked the two previous groups, the Materialists and the Naturalists, and exposed their defects effectively that others were relieved of the task. ‘And God relieved the believers of fighting’ (Q. 33,21) through this mutual combat” (ibid.). Almost similar remarks occur in Tahafat concerning Muslim sects like Mutazlah and others: “My attitude towards these sects themselves is that, while it is not necessary for me to defend any one of them, we are all equally opposed to the philosophers. For we differ among ourselves only in regard to the details; whereas the philosophers attack the very basis of our religion. Let us,

therefore, unite against the common enemy; for at a critical juncture, we must forget our private quarrels” (T p. 8). This can tell us about the methodology of Imam Ghazali more than anything else. The principle of unity according to which and in the context of which non Islamic sciences are to be critiqued is religion specifically belief in God and the day of judgement. And consequently these are two points, which are going to be the criterion for determining the relative commonality and alliance with Islam. But having said that Imam completely realises that the ultimate criterion of truth is Islam and any relative alliance must be geared towards that end and should be ultimately determined by only that end. That’s why having given preference to the Theists as compared to the Materialists and the Naturalists Imam does not hesitate to declare that: “We must . . . reckon unbelievers both these philosophers themselves (The Thiists) and their followers among the Muslim philosophers, such as Ibn Sina, al Farabi and others” (Al p. 32).

Although Imam rejects all three he distinguishes among them. Imam finds some common aspects between Islam and theists, but these common points are to be belief in God and the day of judgement and nothing else.

It does not matter much whether Imam was right historically or not in his assessment of Greek theists, what matters is the principles on which he makes his distinctions and assessments. Imam’s attitude as a whole towards these so called theists is conveniently summarised by Watt:

“The achievement of al-Ghazali was to master their technique of thinking-mainly Aristotelian logic-and then, making use of that, to refashion the basis of Islamic theology, to incorporate as much of the Neoplatonism’s teaching as was compatible with Islam, and to expose the logical

weakness of the rest of their philosophy. The fusion of Greek philosophical techniques with Islamic dogma, which had been partly accomplished by al-Ashari (d. 324/935) was thus in essence completed, though the working out was left to al Ghazali's successors. Undoubtedly al Ghazali learnt much from these Neoplatonists, but the allegation that he finally adopted some of their fundamental principles, which he had earlier criticised, are to be denied, since they are based on works falsely attributed to al Ghazali" (Intro. p. 13).

The above comments clearly bring to forth the delicacy involved in critique as opposed to mere rejection and acceptance. The idea of critique is based on this fundamental principle that: "Assuredly there was in the age of the philosophers, as indeed there is in every age, a group of those godly man, of whom God never denudes the world. They are the pillars of earth, and by their blessing mercy comes down on the people of earth, as we read in the Tradition where Muhammad (peace be upon him) says: "Through them you receive rain, through them you receive sustenance; of their number were the men of the cave". And these, as the Quran declares existed in early times" (Al pp. 38-39).

From this it follows that truth can be found anywhere and everywhere and that even in the teachings of heretics and philosophers truth is to be separated from untruth. The task of critique is akin to that of a "money changer" who suffers no harm if he puts his hand into the counterfeiter's purse; relying on his skills he picks the true gold from among the spurious and counterfeit coins. It is only the simple villager, not the experienced money changer, who is made to abstain from dealing with the counterfeiter. It is not the strong who is kept back from the shore, but the clumsy tiro; not the accomplished snake charmer who is barred from touching the snake, but the ignorant boy" (Al p. 40).

c) Minimalist critique or logical critique concerns the logical consistency and the logical coherence of paradigm. The internal coherence of the paradigm is one of the sign of its truthfulness and the lack of coherence is a sign of the falsity of the paradigm. Imam uses this form of critique, which is exclusively based on the law of contradiction throughout his counter argument in Tahafat and it, forms an important part of his overall aim of showing the fundamental incoherence of the Greek philosophy. And it seems that for Imam, at the rational plane alone, the notion of logical necessity is sufficient to prove the fundamental rationality of a position in the sense that it cannot be treated as untenable in itself if it is not logically contradictory. Thus in his counter argument through out the Tahafat he asks and challenges again and again, his opponents to find any self contradiction in views contrary to theirs, which Imam often coins, in order to posit as speculative alternatives, showing that philosophers' position is not the only tenable position rationally as they assume. If the alternative position is not self contradictory, at the rational plane it has the similar viability and option as that of the position itself. Thus Imam asks again and again, "What can prevent us from believing such a thing, and what is the contradiction involved in it?" (T p. 16), implying that at least at the level of speculative and potential existence all propositions which pass the test of the law of contradiction or logical consistency can be treated as equally rational. Similarly Imam uses the law of contradiction to show the in coherence of certain propositions adhered to by Greek philosophers. Thus he asks philosophers: "You maintain that, in spite of the fact that the revolutions of Saturn are one thirtieth of the Sun, they are equally infinite" (T p. 20). How can these two positions of finitude and infinitude can be maintained for same things at a same time? Is this not to involve oneself in hopeless self contradiction? As if this was not an enough mark of the absurdity of the philosophers' position Imam goes on to question them further exposing and making self evident the self contradiction and absurdity of their position: "Even, so one might ask whether the number of these revolutions is odd or even, or both, or neither. If you say that it

is both odd and even, or that it is neither odd nor even, it will be an evidently absurd thing. But if you say that it is even, the addition of one would make the even odd. How could it be that that which is infinite lacked just one? If you say that it is odd, again the addition of one would make the odd even. How could it be that that which is infinite lacked just one which would have made it even? It follows that you are bound to hold that the number is neither odd nor even” (T pp. 20-21). Classical example of self contradiction.

d) In essentialist critique, we use the form of argument, which may be termed, as an argument from evidence, be that evidence factual or historical. We use this mode of critique to judge the factual errors of a paradigm and if those factual errors are central to the paradigm concerned they may affect the credibility and coherence of that paradigm beyond repair. The question of essentialist critique can be seen, at least, from three different angles as far as Imam’s principles of critique are concerned. Firstly Imam states in general but in the most unambiguous terms that none of the principles of and practices of Islam are contradictory to or contradict the so called hard facts. Imam in the preface to *Tahafat* (pp. 6-7) specifically refutes that certain hadith (for example) are contrary to facts. About one such hadith he writes: “This addition (to hadith) is spurious. We must condemn its author as a liar. The Prophet’s words are only those which have been reported above. However, if this addition were authentic, would it not be easier to interpret it than to reject the evidence (from facts)” (p. 7). And he goes on to add that “(t)he atheists would have the greatest satisfaction if the supporter of religion made a positive assertion that things of this kind are contrary to religion. For then it would be easier to refute religion which stood or fell with its opposition to these things” (ibid.). Secondly he does point out in his argumentation towards the tensions between certain propositions in the Greek philosophy with factual and historical evidence accumulated by Greek sciences on the other hand. Thus he points towards the tension that existed between Greek’s belief in the eternity of world on the one hand

and on the other hand the (factual) claim made in the Greek physics and astronomy concerning the number of spherical revolution completed by certain heavenly bodies. Thus Imam asks, “How will you disprove your opponents if they say that the eternity of the world is impossible. For it leads to the affirmation of spherical revolutions which are infinite in number, and consist of innumerable units. The fact is that these revolutions can be divided into one sixth, or one fourth, or a half” (I p. 20). Thus pointing towards the fundamental contradiction between the implication of Greek metaphysical belief in the eternity of world and the factual position of the Greek physics and astronomy, which attribute finite revolution to the heavenly bodies like Sun and Saturn and Jupiter. Thirdly and most importantly Imam stresses and shows that the fundamental differences between Greek and Islamic thought are not about facts and that the metaphysical differences are not the sort of differences, which can be solved by referring to facts at the empirical level. As Imam puts it clearly with reference to the problem of time, making clear the essentially (contingent) relation between the so called hard facts and metaphysical disputes:

“ . . . at issue between (religious man) and the philosopher is only whether the world is eternal or not. If its beginning in time is to be proved, it is all the same whether it is round body, or a simple thing, or an octagonal or hexagonal figure; and whether the heavens and all that is below them form-as the philosophers say-thirteen layers, or more, or less. Investigation into these facts is no more relevant to metaphysical inquiries than an investigation into the number of the layers of an onion, or the number of the seeds of a pomegranate, would be. What we are interested in is that the world is the product of God’s creative action, whatever is the manner of the action may be” (pp. 7-8).

7. **Conclusion:**

The purpose and overall strategy of the critique may be summarised in the following points.

- Discredit the perverted minority by showing the internal incoherence of their views. This is to be done on the level of immanence while preserving essential exteriority.
- Thus the internal critique is to be carried out in the tacit but explicit context of firm belief in the epistemological truthhood of Islam.
- Highlight the commonalities that would pave the way for the remembrance of the two fundamental principles of belief in Allah and Akhira.

This is of course is to be supplemented by the whole positive work for which the critique is just a prolegomena. But that is beyond the scope of this paper and must be left over for another occasion.